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ABSTRACT 
The sustainability of public finances is currently a hot topic in economic policy debate. 
This is because of the on-going sovereign debt crises in Europe and the long-term public 
spending pressures caused by the impeding demographic change in developed 
countries. This thesis examines some of the approaches that have been used to assess 
the public finance sustainability in the literature. Also, theoretical criteria for 
sustainability are examined. The study is conducted by a way of literature review. 
There is no consensus among economists about the correct theoretical criterion for 
public finance sustainability. Rather, each approach to assess sustainability introduces 
its own, sometimes differing, definitions. Government’s inter-temporal budget 
constraint (IBC) is the most commonly used theoretical criterion for sustainability. We 
find that it is not theoretically waterproof and even invalid in some cases. We suggest an 
alternative criterion from the literature, Bohn’s model-based sustainability, to be used in 
place of the IBC in theoretical settings. 
In the thesis, six different approaches to assess public finance sustainability are 
examined. These are: summary indicators of sustainability, econometric tests, Value-at-
Risk framework, fiscal limits and fiscal space, general equilibrium models and 
generational accounting. Each approach is described and analysed based on research 
found in the literature.   
Summary indicators are the most commonly used practical tool used in sustainability 
assessments. They are based on projections of future public debt and give the budgetary 
adjustment required to satisfy the IBC or reach a target debt level. Econometric tests are 
statistical tests for various theoretical sustainability criteria that can be used to 
determine whether a given criterion holds in the data. Value-at-Risk framework uses 
stochastic simulations of the public sector balance sheet to study the degree of public 
sector solvency. It gives an estimate of a probability distribution for government’s future 
net asset position. Fiscal limits and fiscal space attempt to estimate a public debt ceiling 
for a country based on assumed constraints to government’s fiscal policies. General 
equilibrium models are detailed large-scale frameworks which assess sustainability 
based on comprehensive modelling of the whole economy. Generational accounting 
analyses sustainability by comparing the net tax burden of current and future 
generations. 
We analyse the strengths and weaknesses of each of the approaches and tentatively 
compare them with each other. We find that each approach has its uses. Approaches 
should be viewed as complementary. Availability of data and modelling resources, goals 
of the analysis and other case-specific constraints affect relative suitability of the 
approaches in different situations. From purely theoretical perspective, general 
equilibrium models and the Value-at-Risk approach appear most attractive. We conclude 
that theoretical accuracy of the models doesn’t guarantee the accuracy of the future 
forecasts and thus sustainability estimates. 
 
 
 
Key words: public finance, sovereign debt, fiscal sustainability, public debt 
sustainability, fiscal policy, inter-temporal budget constraint, sustainability indicators  
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Julkisen talouden kestävyys on tällä hetkellä ajankohtainen aihe taloustieteellisessä 
keskustelussa johtuen yhtäältä EU-maita ravistelevista velkakriiseistä, ja toisaalta 
väestön ikääntymisestä kehittyneissä talouksissa, minkä ennakoidaan johtavan 
merkittävään julkisten menojen kasvuun tulevaisuudessa. Tämä tutkielma käy läpi 
joukon kirjallisuudesta löytyviä lähestymistapoja julkisen talouden kestävyyden 
arviointiin. Tämän lisäksi tarkastellaan teoreettisia kriteerejä julkisen talouden 
kestävyydelle. Tutkimusmenetelmä on kirjallisuuskatsaus. 
Ekonomistien keskuudessa ei ole konsensusta siitä, mikä on oikea määritelmä tai 
kriteeri julkisen talouden kestävyydelle. Eri tutkimukset käyttävät usein hieman 
erilaisia kriteerejä. Julkisen sektorin intertemporaalinen budjettirajoite on yleisimmin 
käytetty teoreettinen kriteeri kestävyydelle. Kirjallisuuskatsauksesta käy kuitenkin ilmi, 
että se ei ole teoreettisesti vedenpitävä ja tiettyjen oletusten pätiessä jopa virheellinen. 
Bohnin (2005) malliperusteinen määritelmä kestävyydelle vaikuttaa teoreettisesta 
näkökulmasta paremmalta kriteeriltä kestävyydelle kuin intertemporaalinen 
budjettirajoite. 
Tässä tutkielmassa tarkastellaan kuutta eri lähestymistapaa julkisen talouden 
kestävyyden arviointiin. Ne ovat: kestävyysindikaattorit, ekonometriset testit, Value-at-
Risk malli, fiscal limits ja fiscal space –lähestymistapa, yleisen tasapainon mallit ja 
sukupolvilaskenta. Kutakin lähestymistapaa kuvaillaan ja analysoidaan sitä käsittelevän 
kirjallisuuden perusteella. 
Kestävyysindikaattorit perustuvat ennusteisiin tulevasta valtion velan kehityksestä. Ne 
ilmoittavat tavoitevelkatason saavuttamiseksi tai intertemporaalisen budjettirajoitteen 
toteuttamiseksi vaadittavat muutokset valtion budjettisuureissa. Ekonometriset testit 
testaavat tilastollisesti eri kestävyyskriteereiden pätevyyttä historiallisen datan 
perusteella. Value-at-Risk -lähestymistavassa käytetään stokastisia simulaatioita 
julkisen sektorin kokonaistaseesta arvioimaan julkisen talouden kestävyyttä.  Fiscal 
limits ja fiscal space – lähestymistavassa pyritään määrittämään katto julkiselle velalle 
valtion finanssipolitiikkaa rajoittavien tekijöiden perusteella. Yleisen tasapainon mallit 
ovat yksityiskohtaisia ja laajoja malleja, jossa kestävyyttä analysoidaan mallintamalla 
koko kansantalouden toiminta. Sukupolvilaskennassa analysoidaan kestävyyttä 
vertaamalla nykyisten ja tulevien sukupolvien nettovelkataakkaa.  
Eri lähestymistapojen vahvuuksia ja heikkouksia analysoidaan. Käy ilmi, että tilanteesta 
riippuen eri lähestymistavat ovat soveltuvia. Lähestymistapoja tulisi ajatella toisiaan 
täydentävinä. Pelkästään teoreettisesta näkökulmasta yleisen tasapainon mallit ja 
Value-at-Risk –lähestymistapa vaikuttavat parhailta. Lähestymistavan teoreettinen 
tarkkuus ei kuitenkaan takaa sen ennustetarkkuutta, eikä siis myöskään 
kestävyysarvioiden tarkkuutta.   
 
 
 
 
Avainsanat: julkinen talous, valtion maksukyky, julkisen talouden kestävyysvaje, 
finanssipolitiikka, intertemporaalinen budjettirajoite, kestävyysindikaatorit  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
At the moment sustainability of public finances is a timely topic in many advanced 
economies. Questions have been raised by various commentators, investors and analysts 
whether public finances in the EU countries and in the US are on a sustainable track. 
After the financial crisis of 2008-2009, the public debt of many countries has been on a 
steep upward trajectory due to implementation of various stimulus and relief packages 
directed to financial sector and the economy as a whole. A rising debt combined with 
long-term issues like the demographic change which affects the balance between 
number of people in the labour force and number of retirees, have alerted fiscal 
authorities to study the problem in detail. In fact, some European countries like Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy are currently in serious trouble with their public 
finances which is reflected in the high yield demanded from the government bonds of 
these countries. As of this moment, Greece, Ireland and Portugal have already received 
aid from other member states. It has been argued that the underlying problem in Europe 
is the fragility of banks and the financial sector, not the public sector itself. From the 
perspective of public finance sustainability this is not a valid point since problems of any 
sector, like the financial sector, become problems of the public sector once they get big 
enough. 
Study of public finances is not important only in the current situation in US and in the 
EU. It has been continuously pertinent issue in less developed countries. In less 
developed countries, the public sector is usually more fragile and prone to shocks than 
in developed countries. This is because the public sector of these economies is more 
vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations, commodity price fluctuations (like the price of 
oil), changes in interest rate on government debt, sprees of high inflation and political 
turmoil. In the past, many emerging market economies have experienced crises that 
have been closely tied to problems in public finances. Some of these crises have led to 
debt restructuring efforts spearheaded by the IMF and some have led to outright default.  
The knowledge whether public finances are on a sustainable track is important in many 
respects. Fiscal authorities of a country want to keep finances sustainable in order to 
give a healthy ground for economic growth in the country for years to come. If public 
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finances are not sustainable, this affects the economy as a whole. This is evidenced by 
the fact that public sector accounts for a large part of the total production in most 
countries. Furthermore, it is the public sector that provides the institutions and services 
which are prerequisite for the normal function of corporations. Thus, in order to avoid 
any crises in the public sector and the economy at large, it is valuable for fiscal 
authorities to monitor the sustainability of public finances and inform politicians of any 
significant developments in that area. 
Also, the creditors of the government bodies follow the sustainability of public finances 
closely. After all, their goal is to make profit and therefore they don’t want to pay too 
much for government bonds. In order to have idea of the risk premium they require for 
the bonds, these creditors, which are usually big banks, have to analyse the risks present 
in the public sector. Therefore, the study of sustainability of public finances is crucial for 
them. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis has three goals or research questions. First goal is to critically examine 
various theoretical criteria that have been proposed for sustainability in the literature. 
Second goal is to study and go through different approaches which have been employed 
to measure the sustainability of public finances. The study doesn’t attempt to be 
comprehensive: not all approaches to evaluate public finance sustainability found in the 
literature are covered. Third goal is to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of these 
approaches and compare them with one another. The method of study is literature 
review. 
1.3 CENTRAL DEFINITIONS 
In this thesis, a broad definition of public sector is used. It is defined to comprise of 
central government, local governments, public corporations, central bank and social 
security funds. 
The general definition of sustainability of public finances in this paper is the following: 
public finances are sustainable if consolidated public sector is solvent given current 
policies. That is, public sector is able to honour all its obligations (outlays, transfers, debt 
service, etc.) now and in the future without adjusting its policies (tax rate, promised 
expenditures, etc.). This concept is synonymous with fiscal sustainability and the two 
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are used interchangeably. This general definition elaborated later in Chapter 4 when 
various theoretical criteria of sustainability are examined. Models and approaches to 
assess public finance sustainability often use slightly different definitions for 
sustainability. However, the intent behind these definitions is the same and it is 
described by the general definition given above. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The structure of the thesis is the following. First, in the second chapter, challenges to 
public finance sustainability are outlined in the light of the existing debt burdens and 
large projected costs due to the period of rapid demographic change many advanced 
economies are entering. In the third chapter, public sector balance sheet and income 
statement are defined and described. In the fourth chapter, several alternative 
theoretical criteria for sustainability are examined. In the fifth chapter, summary 
indicators, the first approach to assess sustainability, are examined. In the sixth chapter, 
econometric tests of fiscal sustainability are studied. Seventh chapter defines and 
analyses a Value-at-Risk measure for sustainability. Eighth chapter introduces the 
concepts of fiscal limit and fiscal space and their relation to sustainability. In the ninth 
chapter, some general equilibrium models intended for analysis of sustainability are 
examined. Tenth chapter defines and analyses generational accounting approach to 
public finance sustainability. Eleventh chapter compares different approaches presented 
and examines their strengths and weaknesses. The last chapter concludes. 
2. CHALLENGES TO SUSTAINABILITY 
Public finance sustainability is a current topic for two main reasons. Firstly, in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008-2009 public debt of many countries has 
rocketed to levels that have never been seen before. Markets recognize this and require 
higher yields to compensate for the additional risk. This has resulted in sovereign debt 
crises, especially in Europe. Secondly, the long-run sustainability of public finances in 
many advanced economies is threatened by the impeding large-scale demographic 
change. In the coming 50 years, population ageing is projected to lead to significant 
increases in public expenditures due to higher pension payments and health care costs. 
Furthermore, the demographic change leads to lower expectations of economic growth 
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because of reduced growth of the workforce. This chapter offers a glance at the debt 
burden faced in economies around the world, describes the extent of the coming 
demographic transition in advanced economies and records some estimates of the long-
run sustainability of public finances prepared by governmental institutions. 
2.1 THE DEBT BURDEN AT A GLANCE 
The extent of the debt burden varies greatly internationally. Some countries have little 
debt while others have clearly too much for them to bear. Using gross debt per GDP as 
the benchmark for indebtedness, it is seen that many advanced economies have 
significant stocks of public debt while big emerging economies like China and Russia do 
not have much debt. Figure 1 shows IMF estimates of general government gross debt per 
GDP in selected economies in 2011. 
 
Japan is projected to have the largest debt burden by a wide margin. Greece and Italy 
have debt levels above 100 % of GDP. Greece is nearly in default and markets are 
suspicious of Italy’s ability to pay back its loans which is reflected in recent hikes of 
bond yields. Despite its massive debt stock, Japan is not facing a credit crisis because 
interest rates of government bonds are low due to continued expectations of deflation 
and regulatory pressures that cause Japanese domestic institutions to finance major 
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Figure 1. General government gross debt as percentage of GDP in 2011. 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook estimates (April 2011).  
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portion of the government debt. While United States and big European economies have 
taken a lot of new debt during recent years, they are still below the 100 % of GDP 
boundary. 
Figure 2 below shows the IMF 2011 estimates of net interest expense (interest expense 
minus interest revenue) relative to general government revenues in the same set of 
countries as in Figure 1 with the exception that China and India are missing due to data 
unavailability. Net interest expense per revenue measures the proportion of yearly 
revenues that governments have to utilise just to pay the interest on existing debt.  
 
It seems that in general, those countries that have big gross debt relative to GDP (Figure 
1) also spend large amount of their revenues on interest expenses. However, there are 
also significant differences between the stories told by Figures 1 and 2 because what 
matters for net interest payments is net debt, not gross debt. Furthermore, some 
countries have larger revenue incomes relative to GDP and therefore for a given debt-to-
GDP ratio spend less interest expenses relative to revenues. Also, interest rates for 
different countries differ.  In Figure 2, Japan, which holds the largest stock of gross debt 
relative to GDP in the world, doesn’t seem to especially burdened by interest payments. 
This is because according to IMF statistics net debt in Japan is about half of the gross 
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Figure 2. Net interest expense per general government revenue in 2011. 
Source: : IMF World Economic Outlook estimates (April 2011).  
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debt. Secondly, Japan faces very low interest rates currently. IMF projects Finland and 
Sweden having net interest revenue in 2011. This results from the fact that net debt in 
Finland and Sweden is negative (stock of assets is greater than stock of debt) because 
IMF calculations of net debt count pension funds as government assets. Brazil is 
projected to have a large interest expense burden probably because it has higher 
interest rates than many advanced economies.    
2.2 DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
Major demographic changes are unfolding in the coming decades at the global level. 
Fertility has been declining and longevity has been and is expected to keep increasing 
primarily due to drop in the mortality rates at higher ages. Projections indicate that 
world total population will keep on increasing and the population age composition will 
change significantly. At the global level population is getting older. As a result of this, 
there is an upward trend in the dependency1, although there is variation in the trend in 
different regions. Figure 3 shows the projected trajectory of old-age dependency ratio in 
developed countries, less developed countries and least developed countries.   
The message of the figure is clear: during the next 50 years, the proportion of elderly in 
the population of developed countries will approximately double.  
                                                        
1Dependency measures the number of people outside work force relative to number of people in work 
force. 
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Figure 3. Old-age dependecy ratio. The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio 
of the population aged 65 years or over to the population aged 15-64. Source: 
United Nations, 2010 revision of World Population Prospects.   
More developed countries
Less developed countries
least developed countries
8 
 
The two main drivers behind the trend shown in Figure 3 are decrease in fertility and 
increase in longevity. Fertility has been decreasing after peaking in the middle of the 
20th century. Currently, it has converged to a level of about 2 children per woman. Most 
of the developed countries are now at the point when the large generations reach 
retirement age and new comparatively smaller generations enter the job market which 
increases the dependency ratio. Longevity has been on an increasing trend since 1950 
with gains in life expectancy amounting to 0.1 to 0.2 years per year. The continuing 
upward trend in longevity increases the old-age dependency ratio because people spend 
longer times in retirement and thus the age cohort 65+ increases in size. (United Nations 
2011). 
2.3 SOME SUSTAINABILITY ESTIMATES  
The demographic change leads to increases in age-related public expenditures such as 
pensions and health care in advanced economies. Many research institutes and 
governing bodies such as the IMF, the European Commission and national governments 
have made estimates of public finance sustainability that take into account both the debt 
burden and the projected long-run developments.  
According to European Commission (2009), age-related public expenditure relative to 
GDP is projected to rise on average 4.3 percentage points by 2060 in the EU. The change 
is mainly due to increases in pension, healthcare and long-term care spending. European 
commission assesses the long-run sustainability of public finances by calculating so-
called sustainability gaps. These gaps measure the required adjustment by a shift in the 
projected path of primary balances2. The size of the adjustment is such that the long-run 
solvency of the government is re-established. Figure 4 shows the S2 sustainability gaps 
calculated by the European Commission in 20093.  
                                                        
2 Primary balance equals government revenues minus expenditures excluding interest expenditure. 
3 The S2 and other similar indicators are mathematically derived later in chapter 5 “Summary indicators 
of sustainability”. 
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The S2 sustainability gap for the EU as a whole was 6.5 % of GDP. This means EU 
countries should immediately raise their tax ratios (tax income divided by GDP) by 6.5 
% percentage points in order to become solvent and be make fiscal policy sustainable. 
Alternatively, the sustainability gap could be closed by making an expenditure cut of the 
same magnitude.   According to European Commission (2009) about half of the gaps are 
due to the initial budgetary positions (too much debt compared to projected primary 
surpluses) and half are due to spending pressures arising from long-term demographic 
changes. There is significant variation in degrees of sustainability problems in different 
EU countries.  The gaps as measured by S2 and S1 indicators range between -0.2% 
(Denmark) and 15% (Ireland). It is notable that almost all countries have a positive 
sustainability gap as measured by both indicators – this reflects the weak fiscal position 
due to economic crisis and the intensive phase of demographic transition that most 
countries are entering.  Most countries have gaps near the EU average of 6.5 %.  
In the United States, the Congressional Budget Office prepares long-term fiscal 
projections and estimates of fiscal sustainability. These projections are made for two 
scenarios: the extended-baseline scenario and the alternative scenario. Of these two the 
alternative scenario is perhaps the more realistic one. The alternative fiscal scenario 
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Figure 4. S2 sustainability gap in selected European countries in 2009. Source: 
European Commission (2009). 
10 
 
extends Congressional Budget Office’s 10 year baseline estimate further in time 
incorporating several changes to the current law that are widely expected to occur or 
which alter some provisions which might be hard to sustain in the long run. CBO 
projects that the ageing of the population and the rising cost of health care will cause 
spending on major mandatory health care programs (Medicaid and Medicare) and Social 
Security to grow roughly by 12 % of GDP by 2060 under the alternative fiscal scenario 
respectively. CBO uses fiscal gap indicators to measure long-term sustainability of fiscal 
policies4. Under the alternative fiscal scenario the gaps were 4.8 %, 6.9 % and 8.7 % for 
time horizons of 25, 50 and 75 years. (Congressional Budget Office 2010).  
In Canada, Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer prepares long-term fiscal 
sustainability estimates. Like in the U.S, two scenarios are used: a baseline scenario and 
an alternative scenario. The difference between the two is that under the alternative 
scenario healthcare costs are projected to keep growing at a high rate whereas in 
baseline scenario the growth is assumed to be much more moderate. Due to population 
ageing, spending pressures in health care and elderly benefits are projected to intensify. 
Under the alternative scenario, Canada Health Transfer program, the largest health care 
–related expenditure of Government of Canada, is projected to grow by about 3.5 % per 
GDP by 2060. Elderly benefits are estimated to grow roughly by 1.2 % of GDP by 2060. 
PBO estimates fiscal gaps that are identical to those estimated by CBO in the U.S. Under 
the alternative scenario fiscal gaps were 0.74 %, 1.38 % and 1.89 % of GDP for time 
horizons 25, 50 and 75 years. (Parliamentary Budget Officer 2010). 
3. PUBLIC SECTOR BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT 
In the study of the sustainability of a country’s public finances it is important to consider 
the public sector assets, liabilities, revenues and expenditures as comprehensively as 
possible. Traditionally, researchers have focused mainly on flow variables that appear in 
the budget such as tax revenues, revenues from natural resources, government 
consumption and transfer payments. In the past years, however, more attention has 
                                                        
4 Fiscal gap measure used by CBO is similar to S2 gap used by the European Commission. It is defined as 
the one-time permanent adjustment to primary balance per GDP (tax ratio or spending ratio or both) in 
order to stabilize debt-to-GDP ratio to its initial level in the end of the forecast horizon. For details see 
Chapter 5. 
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been devoted to the analysis of stocks of assets and liabilities that constitute the 
government or public sector balance sheet.  It has been recognized that changes in 
values of these assets and liabilities are and have been an important factor affecting 
sustainability.  
In this thesis, as all-encompassing as possible definition of public sector is used: public 
sector consists of a central government, local governments, public corporations, a 
central bank and social security funds. Basically all entities whose assets or liabilities 
can be turned to government’s ownership should be included in the balance sheet 
analysis. Explicit and implicit guarantees and contingent liabilities that affect 
government net worth (difference between value of assets and liabilities) can have 
important implications for sustainability.  Examples of these “hidden debts” are 
unfunded social security programs, deposit insurance schemes and implicit bail out 
guarantees to e.g. the financial sector. 
This chapter goes through detailed versions of the public sector balance sheet and 
income statement (or equivalently, budget constraint). The goal is to give the reader a 
broad perspective of the factors that may affect public sector net worth.  
3.1 PUBLIC SECTOR BALANCE SHEET 
The 2001 IMF GFS Manual presented in International Monetary Fund (2001) sets out 
detailed definitions for concepts and guidelines for accounting of public sector 
transactions and assets and liabilities. In other words, it gives guidelines for 
implementation of the public sector balance sheet. The 2001 IMF GFS Manual defines 
public sector net worth as the difference between assets and liabilities at market prices. 
Both financial and nonfinancial assets and liabilities are included. Changes in net worth 
could occur as a result of (1) budgetary transactions like tax collection, grants and asset 
returns or government expenditures, interest expenses, payment of subsidies and 
depreciation; (2) price effects, i.e. changes in the value of assets or liabilities; and (3) 
changes in the volumes of assets and liabilities other than those resulting from normal 
transactions, e.g. natural resource discoveries and disasters like floods and earthquakes 
which can destroy assets. 
An alternative definition of the public sector balance sheet is presented in Easterly and 
Yuravlivker (2000). It is broadly in line with the definition of 2001 IMF GFS Manual 
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except in that contingent contracts and value of the social security system is recorded 
directly in the balance sheet. In 2001 IMF GFS Manual they are recorded as 
memorandum items outside balance sheet. The public sector balance sheet and its 
constituents are presented in Table 1. In this view of the public sector balance sheet, 
government’s (= public sector) net worth is analogous to book value of equity in balance 
sheets of private corporations. 
TABLE 1.THE PUBLIC SECTOR BALANCE SHEET AND ITS CONSTITUENTS. 
 
Budgetary flows like tax revenues and government expenditures do not enter the 
balance sheet but affect its evolution in time in a similar way as net sales and production 
costs affect balance sheets of private corporations. Naturally, the future public sector 
revenues and expenditures affect sustainability considerations significantly. Having said 
that, here the expected present values of those flows do not enter the public sector 
balance sheet. The balance sheet is consolidated from entities constituting the public 
sector so that liabilities between these entities are disregarded and duplicate accounts 
are merged. 
3.2 PUBLIC SECTOR INCOME STATEMENT 
Public sector’s income statement accounts for the various flows that affect the evolution 
of its balance sheet. IMF GFSM 2001 divides income statement into two parts: statement 
of government operations and statement of other economic flows. The former includes 
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normal budgetary items like revenues and expenses and net acquisition of financial and 
nonfinancial assets and the net incurrence of debt. The latter records changes in public 
sector net worth that are not a result of government transactions. These are changes in 
values and volumes of assets and liabilities. Here these two statements are merged to 
yield an income statement comparable to those of private corporations similarly as in Da 
Costa and Juan-Ramón (2006). The evolution of public sector balance sheet is described 
by the following income statement (all variables are recorded at market prices): 
                    
           
                 
    (      )          
TABLE 2. TERMS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR INCOME STATEMENT. 
    public sector net worth 
     net operating balance (statement of government operations) 
     other economic flows (statement of other economic flows) 
   public sector revenues 
   public sector expenditures including depreciation and interest expenses 
      net gains due to changes in prices of assets and liabilities 
      net gains due to changes in volumes of assets and liabilities 
       stocks of financial assets and nonfinancial assets owned by public sector 
   stock of debt 
    stock of non-debt, non-contingent liabilities 
4. THEORETICAL CRITERIA FOR PUBLIC FINANCE SUSTAINABILITY 
There is a lack of clear consensus among economists about the definition of public 
finance sustainability. In fact, many research papers in the area of sustainability 
introduce their own criteria for sustainability that are in many ways similar but not 
identical. Sustainable policies, as mentioned earlier, are such that they can be continued 
into the projected future without any changes in taxation or spending patterns. The 
analysis of public finance sustainability boils down to questions of public sector 
solvency and public debt sustainability. This chapter examines the different theoretical 
criteria that have been proposed for fiscal sustainability.  
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4.1 INTER-TEMPORAL BUDGET CONSTRAINT 
A large part of the literature concerning fiscal sustainability takes the inter-temporal 
budget constraint of public sector as a starting point for the analysis. It is often assumed 
that the constraint is binding to government. In many cases, it is taken as the definition 
of sustainability. This choice, however, has been subjected to a fair amount of criticism.  
The derivation of the inter-temporal budget constraint (IBC) starts with simple version 
of public sector income statement, that is, one-period budget constraint which describes 
the evolution of net debt: 
     (   )          
where    is the stock of public sector net debt,   is the interest rate5,     is the primary 
balance of the public sector which equals revenues minus expenditures excluding 
interest expenditure.  
Solving the budget constraint recursively forwards in time gives: 
   (   )
       (   )
        
   (   )
       (   )
        (   )
      
… 
   (   )
       ∑(   )
       
 
   
  
Taking the limit as n tends to infinity: 
      
   
(   )       ∑(   )
       
 
   
  
The crucial assumption behind the inter-temporal budget constraint is that the first 
term giving the present value of the government debt in infinity is assumed to be zero: 
   
   
(   )          
                                                        
5 Here, constant interest rate is assumed for simplicity. Similar results can be derived in the case of time-
dependent interest rate. 
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This assumption is called the transversality condition (TC) or no-Ponzi-game condition 
(NPG). By substituting it to the above equation, the inter-temporal budget constraint is 
received: 
   ∑(   )
       
 
   
  
The transversaility condition and inter-temporal budget constraint are equivalent in this 
context. The inter-temporal budget constraint tells that the present value of the flow of 
primary balances must equal the present stock of net debt. That is, government’s total 
net liability must be equal to its total assets (flow of primary balances).  
The transversality condition is sometimes called the no-Ponzi-game condition meaning 
that government is not allowed to run a Ponzi game and that government doesn’t 
finance Ponzi games. A Ponzi game or scheme is a system in which return to the 
principal of previous investors is paid by new investments by subsequent investors. In 
the case of debt, the debtor is running a Ponzi-game at the expense of the creditors when 
she always pays the interest by issuing more debt. 
Inter-temporal budget constraint is often analysed in the context of per GDP measures.  
The underlying assumption is that GDP grows at a constant exponential rate6   so that 
     (   )
   . Substituting this gives: 
   (   )
       ∑(   )
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(   )  (   )      
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where lower-case symbols refer to the per GDP versions of net debt and primary 
balance. 
Now there is a new variable to be considered in the analysis of sustainability: the growth 
rate of GDP g. Taking limits as n tends to infinity: 
                                                        
6 Similar results can be derived in the case of time dependent growth rates. 
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The new version of the transversality condition states that  
   
   
(
   
   
)
 
        
This is equivalent with the earlier transversality condition. For per GDP variables the 
interpretation is just different: at the limit debt per GDP must grow at a gross rate 
slower than .
   
   
/. For r>g, this allows exponentially growing debt per GDP trajectories. 
For r=g, debt per GDP must be constant. For r<g, debt per GDP must converge to zero in 
an exponential rate.  
The corresponding inter-temporal budget constraint is: 
   ∑(
   
   
)
 
     
 
   
  
As noted earlier, there is disagreement among economists of whether IBC is a binding 
constraint for governments. 
O’Connel and Zeldes (1988) show that Ponzi-games do not exist or equivalently the IBC 
must hold in a credit market with a finite number of rational non-satiable participants 
over time. This means that for IBC not to constrain government lending, the economy 
must consist of an infinite number of agents entering it over time. This seems plausible, 
given infinite time horizon of the analysis. However, the government constantly 
violating the IBC must be infinitely-lived as well which seems less plausible.  
Bagnai (2004) finds it unreasonable that the IBC allows for explosive trajectories of 
debt-to-gdp ratio.  He argues that the IBC is not a fact of nature but rather it is a 
constraint imposed on the behaviour of debtors by the rational creditors in a well-
defined class of inter-temporal equilibrium models. Therefore, he argues, if the class of 
models to which IBC is based is true, “unsustainable” debt paths will never be observed. 
This is because the IBC must be respected in these models in equilibrium and thus, 
observed violations of the constraint must be temporary and hence irrelevant as far as 
the infinite-horizon asymptotic IBC is concerned.  Thus, IBC may appear to be violated 
only because 1) it is not binding in the economy for some 2) it is a temporary violation. 
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Furthermore, Bagnai (2004) seems to argue that assessment of IBC in economies in 
which it is binding is a futile exercise: the possible violations are only temporary and 
thus don’t require any actions. However, we would argue that examining whether IBC 
holds or how big adjustment is required for it to hold in the projected future is useful in 
these economies precisely because governments position as a debtor is grounded on the 
fact that IBC holds: hence, fiscal authorities need to periodically adjust policies so that 
creditors can reasonably expect IBC to hold. 
There are several theoretical models in which IBC doesn’t have to hold. Diamond (1965) 
overlapping generations model may generate competitive equilibria in which growth 
rate of the labour force exceeds the long-run return on capital. In these cases the 
economy is said to be dynamically inefficient and government debt can increase at rate 
higher than the interest rate violating the IBC. Counter-argument to this is that empirical 
evidence indicates that most of the advanced economies are dynamically efficient (Abel 
et al. 1989).  However, de la Croix and Michel (2002, 192) show that in an overlapping 
generations model based on Diamond (1965) IBC doesn’t have to hold given that 
government can tax both the young and the old generation even if the economy is 
dynamically efficient. Other examples of where IBC doesn’t constrain government in 
dynamically efficient economy are Persson (1985) and Wigger (2009).  
Fiscal theory of the price level developed by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford 
(1995) among others also touches upon the meaning of inter-temporal budget 
constraint. According to this somewhat controversial theory, the IBC can be made to 
hold by changes in the general price level   . In this case, the government’s inter-
temporal budget constraint states that the real value of government debt 
  
    
 must equal 
to the present value of future cash flows: 
  
    
 ∑(   )       
 
   
  
Fiscal theory of the price level claims that in some situations the general price level can 
be affected by fiscal policy via the inter-temporal budget constraint. In other words, in 
addition to changes in tax or expenditure policies, changes in the price level can serve as 
means of satisfying the IBC and re-establishing sustainability. 
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4.2 BOHN’S MODEL-BASED SUSTAINABILITY 
Bohn (2005) criticizes the use of IBC in sustainability analyses and introduces criterion 
for sustainability which he terms Model-Based Sustainability (MBS). The MBS criterion 
generalises the traditional deterministic IBC to a world with uncertainty. Bohn argues 
that the question which policies are sustainable is a general equilibrium question about 
the behaviour of potential government creditors. Different assumptions about the 
behaviour of creditors lead to different conclusions about sustainability of fiscal policies. 
Under the assumptions that potential creditors are infinitely-lived optimizing agents, 
government doesn’t run a negative debt in the long-run and that financial markets are 
complete Bohn (2005) argues that the inter-temporal budget constraint takes the form 
(Model-Based Sustainability criterion) 
   ∑   ,        -
 
   
  
where     is the economy’s pricing kernel for contingent claims on period (t+n) (the 
state-contingent discount factor). The MBS criterion is derived from optimizing creditor 
behavior. It differs from the usual IBC in that the discount rates for future surpluses 
depend on the distribution of primary surpluses across states of nature. Bohn (2005) 
shows that the above IBC condition can lead to government facing constraints other than 
the traditional IBC. 
4.3 CONVERGENCE OF THE DEBT TO OUTPUT RATIO 
A common criterion for fiscal sustainability is the convergence of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
to a finite value (the boundedness criterion): 
   
   
  
  
    
   
      
This condition was first proposed as a sufficient condition for sustainability in Domar 
(1994). A stricter form of this criterion is that debt-to-output ratio must eventually 
converge back to its initial value. It is analysed for example in Blanchard et al. (1990).   
The above condition requires that eventually debt cannot grow at a rate greater than 
growth rate g of the economy. Inter-temporal budget constraint and the transversality 
condition requires that debt cannot grow at a rate greater than the interest rate r. Thus, 
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when r > g, as is usually assumed, this criterion is stricter than the inter-temporal 
budget constraint. When r < g, the situation is the opposite.  
The asymptotic boundedness condition of debt to output ratio compares the 
governments collateral, fraction of output taxed, to the stock of debt. It can be argued 
that the boundedness condition is always a looser condition that the inter-temporal 
budget constraint. It is reasonable to assume that primary balance cannot exceed output 
in any period. Thus, assuming IBC holds implies 
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for all t, assuming r>g. Therefore, if r>g, the assumption that primary balance can never 
exceed output requires the boundedness of debt-to-output ratio for all t. This means that 
the boundedness criterion is looser also when r>g.  
4.4 OTHER CRITERIA 
Roubini (2001) argues that the inter-temporal budget constraint is too loose criterion 
for fiscal sustainability. According to the inter-temporal budget constraint a government 
could run very large primary deficits for a long time provided that it could commit to run 
primary surpluses in the long run to satisfy the IBC. Roubini argues that this is not 
realistic for three reasons. Firstly, government cannot credibly commit to such a path. 
Secondly, adjustment required to run large enough primary surpluses in the long run 
would be highly costly and inefficient given distortionary taxation – i.e. it doesn’t make 
sense to have marginal tax rates of 70 % in the long run to compensate for low marginal 
tax rates of 10 % in the short run. Thirdly, if the adjustment falls on government 
consumption rather than taxes it may again be unfair and inefficient to cut government 
spending and services to low levels in the long run to allow large spending in the short 
run. Roubini (2001) suggest that a very practical criterion for sustainability: public debt 
can be viewed as sustainable as long as the public debt to GDP ratio is non-increasing. 
This means that primary balance to output ratio should fulfil the following condition: 
    
   
   
      
Artis and Marcellino (2000) distinguish between solvency and sustainability. They 
define that a government is solvent if the IBC is fulfilled, that is, governement is capable 
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during an infinite horizon to service its debt. On the other hand, according Artis and 
Marcellino sustainability is a more imprecise concept referring ability of government 
under current policies to achieve a pre-specified debt ratio in a finite time horizon. 
The Treaty of Maastricht sets explicit conditions for fiscal sustainability of the EMU 
countries. Article 109 (1) of the treaty requires  “sustainability of the governments 
financial position” for a country’s eligibility to EMU. The treaty further defines the 
criteria to assess the sustainability by setting ceiling values of 3 % and 60 % for deficit 
and debt to GDP ratios respectively.  The issue of sustainability is also elaborated in The 
Stability and Growth Pact by introducing the medium target of a fiscal position close to 
balance or in surplus thus tightening the deficit rule of the Treaty of Maastricht. It is 
unclear what “a position of close to balance or surplus in medium term” actually 
constitutes. In the EU framework sustainability is thus defined as non-violation of 
predefined conditions which include an arbitrary debt to output ceiling which is 
consistent with the boundedness criterion of sustainability.  
5. SUMMARY INDICATORS OF PUBLIC FINANCE SUSTAINABILITY 
After discussing the theoretical criteria for sustainability it is now possible to turn to the 
different approaches employed in sustainability assessments. Firstly, summary 
indicators which employ rather simple discounted cash flow calculations are studied. 
Summary indicators are perhaps the most common approach to analyse sustainability in 
practice. These indicators are derived from the government budget constraint governing 
the evolution of debt as a function of interest rates, growth rate of the economy and 
future primary balances. These derivations do not use an explicit economic model to 
account to for the various interactions between the model variables and hence the 
indicators derived can only be regarded as giving an approximation of the degree of 
sustainability. They take as an input the projected primary balances, interest rates and 
growth rates of the economy. The indicators are widely used by for example European 
commission, national governments and the International monetary fund to assess 
sustainability. 
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5.1 FINITE HORIZON TAX GAP INDICATOR 
The derivation is based on the equation describing the evolution of net debt per output 
that was derived earlier: 
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Compounding the equation to period t+n gives 
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Defining a specific time horizon (t, T) and a debt-to-output target level    to be achieved 
at the end of the time horizon gives the condition for permanent constant adjustment to 
primary balance relative to output       required to achieve the target: 
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Using the formula for geometric series gives the size of the gap: 
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This indicator is equivalent to the S1 indicator used by the European Commission. In S1 
indicator the end of the time horizon is the year 2060 and the target debt-to-output ratio 
is 60 %. Congressional Budget Office in the US and Office of the Parliamentary Budget 
Officer in Canada use the same type of indicator which they term fiscal gap. They use 
time horizons of 25, 50 and 75 years. They require that at the end of time horizon debt-
to-output ratio returns to its initial value. 
Finite horizon tax gap indicator determines a target level for debt-per-GDP ratio to be 
reached at the end of the specified time horizon. It is called tax gap indicator because the 
adjustment is measured in terms of change in primary balance to output ratio so that the 
indicator gives the permanent change required in the total tax ratio, total tax revenues 
per GDP, to reach the target debt-per-GDP ratio at the end of the time horizon. For 
example, if FTGAP = 3 %, this means a permanent raise of 3 % in the tax income per GDP 
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ratio would close the sustainability gap if the tax hike didn’t have any dynamic effects. 
However, the required permanent adjustment in the primary balances per output can be 
realised equally well by cutting expenditures relative to GDP or by any combination of 
tax revenue increase and expenditure cut that permanently increase primary balance 
relative to output by the amount specified by the indicator.  
Finite horizon tax gap indicator (and any other tax gap indicator for that matter) divides 
the burden of adjustment equally (as a proportion of GDP) to the years belonging to the 
time horizon. This means that the change in net taxes paid relative to total output is 
equal in every period. Thus, the finite horizon tax gap indicator assumes that the 
required adjustment is smoothed over the time horizon.  
5.2 INFINITE HORIZON TAX GAP INDICATOR 
The infinite horizon tax gap indicator is based on the inter-temporal budget constraint. 
It measures the permanent constant adjustment to primary balance to output ratio 
required to satisfy the IBC: 
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The sustainability indicator S2 used for example by the European Commission is 
equivalent to the above indicator. Assuming r > g, infinite horizon tax gap can be derived 
from the formula of finite horizon tax gap by taking the limit T tends to infinity. This just 
means that if debt converges to a finite level at infinity it is consistent with IBC when 
r>g.  
ITGAP indicator divides the required adjustment relative to GDP evenly to infinite time 
horizon. Similarly as the finite horizon indicator, ITGAP is a tax gap indicator which 
means that its value can be interpreted as immediate permanent change to tax ratio 
required for IBC to hold. The change to primary balances can come equally well from 
expenditure cuts. 
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5.3 FINANCING GAP 
The needed adjustment as measured by finite or infinite horizon tax gaps can be divided 
to the time horizon in ways other than smoothing the adjustment evenly as a percentage 
of GDP. Financing gap takes the flow of predicted future primary balances and compares 
it with the current level of net debt. In the case of infinite horizon, it gives the immediate 
adjustment to the debt per GDP level needed to satisfy the inter-temporal budget 
constraint: 
      ∑(
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The indicator measures the adjustment required in present value terms relative to 
output unlike tax gaps in which the adjustment was given in a form of an annuity. 
Measuring the gap in present value terms might be useful in some cases. At minimum, it 
is a good way to demonstrate the extent of the sustainability problem. A similar 
indicator can be defined for finite horizons. In that case, the financing gap measures the 
immediate required change in debt per GDP level to attain the target level of debt per 
GDP at the end of the chosen time horizon. Financing gap is analysed e.g. in Giammarioli 
et al. (2007). 
5.4 PRIMARY GAP 
Unlike previous indicators, the primary gap assumes the constancy of primary balances 
in the future. It determines the constant primary balance that would satisfy the required 
infinite or finite horizon sustainability conditions. In the infinite horizon case, primary 
gap indicator is defined as the difference between the required constant primary 
balance to satisfy the government’s inter-temporal budget constraint and the projected 
primary balance. It was proposed by Buiter et al. (1985).  Assuming r>g and substituting 
        to the IBC and solving for    gives: 
   
(   )  
   
  
This is called the “debt stabilising primary balance”. It means that if       , debt ratio 
decreases and if       , debt ratio increases. The only stable long-run steady state is 
       because other values of primary balance lead either to unbounded increase or 
decrease of the debt-to-output ratio. The condition        is equivalent with the 
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criterion of sustainability proposed by Roubini (2001) which requires the debt-to-
output ratio to be non-increasing.   
The primary gap is the difference between debt stabilising primary balance and the 
projected primary balance: 
                    
(   )  
   
      
While primary gap gives a direct target for the adjustment in fiscal policy, it comes with 
a caveat: primary gap doesn’t take into account the projected future of government 
revenues and expenditures and therefore is not useful in guiding fiscal policy when 
there is significant pressure coming from the revenue or expenditure side of the budget 
in the future. Assuming a constant primary balance places inordinate burden to those 
years in which expenditures are projected to exceed revenues by the largest margin. 
5.5 NOTES ABOUT THE SUMMARY INDICATORS 
A key issue with summary indicators of public finance sustainability is whether to use 
infinite or finite horizon indicators. The problem with infinite horizon indicators is that 
predictions about the far future have to be made. Furthermore, they require the 
assumption that the inter-temporal budget constraint is de facto a constraint to 
government behaviour. The fact is that the IBC is not unanimously accepted in the 
literature. However, having said that there are grave problems with finite horizon 
indicators as well. According to Andersen (2010) finite horizon analyses are extremely 
sensitive to the particular end-point imposed. This also makes the analysis somewhat 
arbitrary because a target debt level has to be specified. It is hard to define a public debt 
ceiling for a country, let alone an optimal public debt level. In addition, the end-year of 
the finite horizon indicators has to be changed from time to time which may cause large 
changes in the values of the indicator that may be hard to communicate to policy 
makers. A solution to this might be that the length of the time horizon is fixed, like in 
sustainability reports of the CBO in the U.S and PBO in Canada. 
Andersen (2010) emphasises the need to look beyond the infinite horizon tax gap 
indicator, or any single indicator for that matter, to the projected path of primary 
balances underlying the single value of the indicator. Depending on the profile of 
projected primary balances different policies may be optimal.  
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The presented summary indicators of sustainability do not take into account the 
interactions between the variables: for example those between debt level and interest 
rates and tax rate and economic growth. Thus, the results can be taken only as an 
approximation of the extent of the sustainability problem.  
The values received from the sustainability indicators depend crucially on the inputs: 
flow of predicted primary balances, current debt level, interest rates and growth rates. 
The values of the inputs have to be determined by using some economic and 
econometric forecasting models. Therefore, these models and their assumptions, 
whatever they may be, represent an underlying framework behind any estimates of 
sustainability given by the summary indicators. These underlying economic models are 
an essential factor behind the results. Hence, the analysis of any values of the summary 
indicators of sustainability will be incomplete without careful analysis of underlying 
economic forecasting models.  
Haaparanta (2011) emphasises the need of using internally consistent projections of the 
key inputs to the summary indicators. He notes that in Ministry of Finance (2010), which 
is a standard application sustainability gap indicators, the projections about the future 
public spending and economic growth are contradictory and thus cannot simultaneously 
be realised in standard growth models. To avoid these kinds of errors, Haaparanta 
recommends making the predictions using a consistent economic model instead of 
utilising simple ad-hoc predictions or assumptions. 
One problem with the summary indicators is that there is not any explicit consideration 
for uncertainty of the estimated values of indicators. Many sustainability reports like 
European Commission (2009) include scenario and sensitivity analyses in which the 
various inputs to the calculation of summary indicators, such as the interest rates and 
growth rates, are varied and new values for the indicators are determined. These types 
of sensitivity analyses are essential feature of the practical use of the indicators because 
in order to draw any policy implications, it is important to get a sense of the uncertainty 
inherent in the point estimates of summary indicators. However, it would be even 
better, if models (the underlying framework) that yield the inputs to calculations and the 
indicators itself would explicitly account for uncertainty. There have been some 
extensions to the presented indicators that account for uncertainty, e.g. in Giammarioli 
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et al. (2007). Ideally, the result of sustainability analyses with uncertainty would be a set 
of estimated distributions for the output variables like the sustainability gaps. 
Policy implications of a sustainability gaps as measured by the summary indicators are 
not straightforward. According to Barro (1979) tax smoothing argument, tax rates 
should be kept constant over time to minimize tax distortions, allowing government 
budget to absorb variations in net expenditures. Hence, temporary expenditure 
variations would be absorbed through budget, while permanent expenditure changes 
require a permanent change in the tax rate. Thus, different underlying reasons causing 
the sustainability gaps may lead to different conclusions about needed policy actions. 
For instance, in the case of demographic change due to permanent lower level of fertility 
and permanent higher longevity which are the primary causal factors behind the 
sustainability problems in developed countries, it would seem that the correct policy 
response would be an immediate permanent change in the tax rate. However, this 
argument disregards the issues of intergenerational equity. 
6. ECONOMETRIC TESTS OF PUBLIC FINANCE SUSTAINABILITY 
This section examines the various econometric tests that have been proposed as tests of 
fiscal sustainability. In this strand of literature, different theoretical conditions for 
sustainability are tested with historical data of, among other things, debt and deficits. 
This section is divided into two parts: unit root and cointegration tests of sustainability 
and test for Bohn’s model-based sustainability. Definitions of central mathematical 
concepts used in the Chapter can be found in Appendix 1. 
6.1 UNIT ROOT AND COINTEGRATION TESTS OF SUSTAINABILITY 
One of the first attempts to test sustainability by econometric means is Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986). In that paper, Hamilton and Flavin derive a statistical test to determine 
whether the inter-temporal budget constraint or equivalent transversality condition 
holds in empirical data. They use a detailed framework accounting for the general debt 
structure of government bonds and possibility of deficit monetising (money printing).  
Their null hypothesis which is equivalent with the IBC is the following: 
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where    is the real market value of government debt, r is average real return earned on 
government bonds, and              is real primary balance: a sum of tax revenue 
and seigniorage revenue minus government spending.   
Specifically, they test whether      in the formulation: 
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where    is regression disturbance term and    denotes the expectations of creditors 
which Hamilton and Flavin assume to be formed rationally. 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) find that the IBC holds (i.e.      ) in the empirical data for 
US during the years 1960-1984 and conclude that IBC seems to have been a restriction 
on government borrowing during that period. It is noteworthy that Hamilton and Flavin 
(1986) test whether IBC holds in the data but take no stance of whether it should hold. 
Thus, a negative result wouldn’t have meant that government policy had not been 
sustainable but rather that IBC has not been a relevant constraint for government during 
the period in question. 
Wilcox (1989) uses the same data set as Hamilton and Flavin and finds that if the 
hypothesis of constant interest rate is relaxed and stochastic violations to the inter-
temporal budget constraint are considered as well, then the null hypothesis that IBC 
holds in the data must be rejected. 
Trehan and Walsh (1988) show that if real revenues, real spending and real debt have 
unit roots, a stationary deficit (including interest payments) is sufficient to guarantee 
that IBC holds. Trehan and Walsh test these statements in US data spanning years 1890-
1986 and find that it is consistent with IBC. 
Trehan and Walsh (1991) generalizes results of their previous paper. Firstly, with 
variable discount rates, IBC holds if debt is difference-stationary and if the discount rate 
is strictly positive. This statement can be understood by noting that if debt    is 
difference-stationary with mean    the expected debt n-periods forward is:  
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  ,    -         
In other words, expected growth of debt is linear.  This implies that the expected present 
value of debt tends to zero in accordance with the transversality condition and the inter-
temporal budget constraint because discounting factor decays exponentially.   
Secondly, Trehan and Walsh (1991) show that IBC holds if a quasi-difference of debt 
          is stationary for some         and if debt and primary surpluses are 
cointegrated, covering the case of non-stationary with-interest deficits.  The intuition 
behind this condition is the fact that          is stationary with          implies 
that asymptotic rate of growth of debt is     which is in turn less than interest rate  . 
Hence, the asymptotic expected present value of debt tends to zero in line with the 
transversality condition.  
Using these tests described above, Trehan and Walsh (1991) find that postwar US fiscal 
policy is consistent with the IBC.   
Bohn (2005) applies unit root tests to a longer sample of US data spanning the time 
period 1792-2003. He finds that there is no credible evidence of unit roots in the U.S. 
debt-GDP and deficit-GDP ratios and that Trehan and Walsh (1988) condition for IBC to 
hold is satisfied in the data. Absence of unit roots means that debt-GDP ratio is 
stationary and thus policies are sustainable.  
6.2 TEST FOR BOHN’S MODEL-BASED SUSTAINABILITY  
Bohn (1998) introduces an approach to sustainability testing which he names Model-
Based Sustainability (MBS). The condition for model-based sustainability which is a 
generalization of the usual inter-temporal constraint was referred to earlier (MBS 
criterion): 
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Under the MBS framework sustainability analysis reduces to testing whether or not the 
primary balance-output ratio responds positively to increases in public debt-output 
ratio. The regression to test this is:  
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where   is a constant and    is a composite of determinants of the primary balance other 
than the initial stock of debt. Bohn (1998) shows that if     in the equation above,    
is bounded as a share of GDP and if the present value of GDP is finite, then fiscal policy 
satisfies the MBS criterion.  
Bohn (1998) estimates above regression for US data encompassing the period 1916-
1995. He finds strong evidence in favour of     in US data for the period 1916-1995. 
International Monetary Fund (2003, 113-152) applies Bohn’s MBS test to a sample of 
industrial and developing countries. The results signal that the sustainability condition 
holds for industrial countries and developing countries with low debt ratios. It fails for 
developing countries with high debt ratios. Bohn (2005) continues in this track and 
finds robust positive response of primary surpluses to fluctuations in the debt-GDP ratio 
in the US during the period 1792-2003 and hence concludes that US fiscal policy has 
been sustainable. Mendoza and Ostry (2008) use MBS test for 34 emerging market and 
22 industrial countries over the period 1990-2005. They find that the MBS condition for 
fiscal solvency is consistent with the data for both emerging market and industrial 
countries.  
While Mendoza and Ostry (2008) consider MBS framework a powerful and tractable 
tool to find out if government policies have been sustainable, they note two caveats with 
the framework. Firstly, the test assumes complete markets. In the case of incomplete 
asset markets where there are not sufficient state-contingent claims to fully hedge 
against possible shocks, Mendoza and Ostry (2008) argue that tighter debt limits than 
those imposed by the MBS criterion are required. Secondly, they note that it is unclear 
how to interpret results when   is statistically insignificant or when    . One 
interpretation is that failure of the test indicates that MBS criterion is not a relevant 
constraint for government borrowing in the economy. Alternatively, such a failure could 
mean that either MBS is a relevant constraint but market anticipates a policy change or 
government policies are unsustainable.  
6.3 NOTES ABOUT ECONOMETRIC TESTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY   
Bohn’s model based sustainability approach to econometric testing seems robust and 
preferable to the earlier unit root tests. However, the problem with traditional 
application of econometric tests is that they provide information about the sustainability 
of past policies only. This is fine if the purpose of the research is to examine 
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sustainability in retrospect. However, usually a more interesting question is the 
sustainability of the current fiscal policy as projected into the future. If econometric tests 
were applied to projected future data, they could give information about the 
sustainability of current fiscal stance, that is, the expected future fiscal policy.  The 
usefulness of such an exercise is not clear, however, because the researcher can build in 
any feedback relations into the projected data. If projected data and sustainability 
testing were done in credibly separate processes, and the projections were trustworthy, 
applying econometric tests to the projected data might be useful. We were unable to find 
any papers doing this. 
7. VALUE-AT-RISK MEASURE OF SUSTAINABILITY 
Every assessment of public finance sustainability contains considerable amount of 
uncertainty because in order to assess sustainability uncertain predictions into the far 
future have to be made. This chapter goes through a Value-at-Risk framework of 
sustainability by Barnhill and Kopits (2003) which attempt explicitly to account for the 
uncertainty in predictions of future values of relevant variables such as budget balances, 
growth rates and interest rates.  
In financial mathematics and risk management Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a commonly used 
risk measure of the risk of loss on a portfolio of financial instruments. It measures the 
worst possible loss over a target horizon with a given level of confidence. For example, if 
one-month 95 % Value-at-Risk for a portfolio of stocks is 1 million , this means that the 
monthly loss on the portfolio is greater than or equal to 1 million with probability 5 %. 
VaR methodology is commonly used in the financial industry to manage risk exposure. 
Barnhill and Kopits (2003) apply VaR methodology to analyse the public finance 
sustainability. The approach simulates a distribution of possible future financial 
conditions for the government and assesses the probability of financial failure given this 
distribution. The analysis of Barnhill and Kopits is based on the income statement of the 
consolidated public sector encompassing both monetary and fiscal authorities: 
                                  
Public sector revenue consists of tax receipts less government transfers (T), determined 
by the level of economic activity, the tax structure and administrative efficiency; net 
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revenue from resource sales (N), a function of production level, production cost and 
resource price; and income from seigniorage (S). Expenditure is comprised of 
government consumption (G), made up of mandatory and discretionary payments on 
wages, goods and services; and interest payments given by the product of average 
interest rate (r) and the net stock of public debt outstanding (B). The net debt consists of 
domestic liabilities less assets and of foreign liabilities less assets. The term 
            refers to public sector primary balance excluding seigniorage revenue. 
Furthermore, the public sector may hold a stock of net unfunded contingent liabilities 
(C) relating to social security programs, deposit insurance schemes, insurance for 
natural disasters or other government guarantees that may realized and converted into 
B. Realization of C is affected by the level of economic activity, demographic trends, 
effectiveness of bank supervision, bank capitalization and occurrence of natural 
disasters.  
In the framework, the net value  of the public sector at t=0 is the sum of the present 
values of the terms in the income statement7: 
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where Z’ is the primary balance generated by the existing fiscal system (tax structure 
and mandatory spending programs in existence at t=0),    is the probability of realizing 
contingency     at time t and     is the discounted net amortization schedule of the net 
debt so that    ∑ (   )
     
 
   . Calculation of the net value assumes that there is no 
discretionary adjustment in tax structure or government spending in the future. Also, 
income from seignorage    is assumed to equal zero at all times.  
If net value is non-negative, the public sector is deemed solvent and policies are 
sustainable8. In traditional assessments of sustainability, the expected value of net value 
                                                        
7 Barnhill and Kopits (2003) use the term net worth instead of net value. Net value is used here because 
net worth has a different definition in this thesis. 
8 The net value is related to inter-temporal budget constraint in the following way:               . 
Having a positive net value is equivalent to saying that government doesn’t run a Ponzi scheme. 
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is studied. Here V is explicitly recognized as a stochastic variable and its distribution 
estimated. 
Barnhill and Kopits (2003) model the public sector net value as a function of underlying 
risk variables: 
    (              )  
The equation tells that the public sector net value depends on the present and future 
level  of output (q) , interest rates at home and abroad (     ), the exchange rate (f) 
world commodity prices (p_N) and the domestic price level (p). 
The risk variables determine the financial environment thus and the asset prices and 
present values of future revenues and expenditures. Therefore, by simulating the risk 
variables, distributions for government assets, liabilities and net value can be estimated. 
From the estimated distributions, relevant Value-at-Risk measures can be calculated. 
In order to simulate the behaviour of the risk variables, Barnhill and Kopits assume that 
they follow known stochastic processes. Barnhill and Kopits use different stochastic 
processes for description of different variables. For example, they use Brownian motion 
for rates of return, output and prices and time-dependent mean reversion process for 
interest rates. Parameters of the stochastic processes are estimated from historical data. 
By estimating the historical correlations between the risk variables, they can reconstruct 
the correlation structure inherent in the variables. In practice this means that imposing 
the correlation structure of the risk variables on the error terms of the stochastic 
procesess. This way Barnill and Kopits can combine the stochastic processes describing 
the time-evolution of the risk variables and the correlation structure to yield simulated 
values of the risk variables.  
Barnhill and Kopits apply their Value-at-Risk framework to study the sustainability of 
public sector finances in Ecuador. Based on data from year 2000 they simulate 
distribution of public sector net value in year 2001. They estimate that one-year 95 % 
VaR of Ecuador was 29 US$ billion. Because, absent risk, net value of the public sector 
was 8 US$ billion, it is equivalent to say that net value of the public sector with 5 % 
probability was  -21 US$ billion. It is noteworthy that assessment focused expected 
value of public sector would have found no sustainability problem because expected 
public sector net value was 8 US$ billion.  Insolvency, that is negative net value of the 
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public sector, is predicted to occur with 35 % probability. Their simulations indicate that 
the principal sources of fiscal risk for Ecuador were volatility in the interest yield 
spread, the exchange rate, and oil prices together with their comovements.  
The VaR approach of Barnhill and Kopits is a valuable tool for analysis of public finance 
sustainability. It attempts to account for most of the complexities involved in the 
analysis of sustainability. Specifically, it is an improvement to traditional approaches 
because uncertainty is explicitly and more realistically modelled. In addition, a 
comprehensive view of the public sector net value is undertaken with due recognition to 
the fact that changes in values of government assets and liabilities significantly affect 
public sector solvency and policy sustainability.  
At heart of the VaR approach is the estimation of distribution of government net value 
and thus solvency. Both effects from changes in asset values and present values of future 
budgetary flows are accounted for. Usage of the VaR approach is not limited to 
calculation of specific VaR estimates. Other risk measures such as conditional Value-at-
Risk can be calculated as easily. By estimating the distribution of government net value, 
the VaR approach allows for the complete risk management of public sector assets and 
liabilities. 
Barnhill and Kopits (2003) note that the VaR approach is open to question on several 
grounds. Firstly, the variances and covariances of the risk variables estimated from past 
data may not provide a reliable picture of future risks. This shortcoming is mitigated by 
the fact that VaR approach flexible is in that the risk models can be readjusted on the 
basis of expert opinion. Secondly, Barnhill and Kopits point out that the contingent 
liability modelling is lacking because risks stemming from e.g. financial system defaults 
are not accounted for in a comprehensive manner. Thirdly, the approach needs quite 
rich data about public sector assets and liabilities which is not available in every 
country. Public sector balance sheets are a minimum input requirement for VaR 
analysis.  
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8. FISCAL LIMITS, FISCAL SPACE AND SUSTAINABILITY 
Recently a few novel approaches have been developed for estimating public debt ceiling 
for a country. Knowledge of an upper limit for a country’s public debt would be very 
useful for sustainability assessments since it would give indication of how much more 
debt the country is able to sustain at maximum. Here two approaches are analysed. The 
first tries to determine so-called fiscal limit for a country. Fiscal limit is the point beyond 
which taxes and government expenditures can no longer adjust to stabilize the value of 
government debt. This approach stems from the literature on monetary and policy 
interactions and appears in for example in Bi (2010), Cochrane (2010) and Leeper and 
Walker (2011a). The second approach attempts to estimate a debt ceiling for a country 
based on the country’s past record of fiscal policy. It has been developed by Ostry et al. 
(2010).   
8.1 FISCAL LIMITS 
The concept of fiscal limit appears in novel and growing strand of literature on monetary 
and fiscal policy interactions.  Our treatment of the subject is based on Bi (2010). 
The fiscal limit of a country gives the maximum level of debt that the country’s 
government can accommodate solely by fiscal instruments. After an economy hits the 
fiscal limit, the government has to stabilise debt by monetary policy: seigniorage 
revenue generates enough surplus to stabilise the level of debt. Alternatively, if this kind 
of money printing is not possible, government can default on some of its obligations 
such as the debt or promised expenditures. Thus, determining the fiscal limit of a 
country and comparing it to the present and projected future levels of debt gives 
indication of how much room the government has left for fiscal policy adjustments. This, 
in turn, is valuable piece of information in public finance sustainability assessments.  
The most common economic rationale for existence of fiscal limits follows from the 
Laffer curve. The Laffer curve depicts an inverse U-shaped between the tax rate and 
collected tax revenue. Under distortionary taxation, higher tax levels lead to diminishing 
incentives to work, save and invest and thus to lower levels of realised tax bases. As the 
tax rate is increased, at some point the marginal relative decrease in the tax base will 
exceed the marginal relative increase in tax rate and from that point on the collected tax 
revenue will fall. Thus, there is some level of the tax rate which maximizes tax revenue. 
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Given a level of promised government expenditures, the existence of Laffer curve 
implies some maximum stream of primary surpluses that the government can generate. 
Because government debt is valuable only to the extent it is backed up by flow of future 
primary surpluses (assuming seigniorage revenues are zero), and the present values of 
this flow is bounded, the size of government debt relative to output must be bounded as 
well9.  Fiscal limit B* can be defined (Bi 2010): 
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where Q is the discount factor,      is the maximum tax revenue and G is government 
spending and transfers. The actual fiscal limit is usually below the economic fiscal limit 
defined above because political considerations prevent tax rates reaching revenue 
maximising levels. 
The fiscal limit is a model-dependent measure like most of the measures related to 
sustainability. Next we describe the way Bi (2010) attempts to estimate the fiscal limit. 
Bi (2010) constructs an infinite-horizon model of a closed economy in which fiscal limits 
arise endogenously from Laffer curves. The economy has a simple linear production 
technology and productivity follows an exogenous stochastic process. Government is 
modelled as an automaton which finances purchases and lump-sum transfers to 
households by collecting tax revenue and issuing bonds. Purchases are modelled by an 
exogenous stochastic process and transfers follow productivity counter-cyclically. 
Government follows a simple tax rule in which tax rate rises linearly with increases in 
debt. Bi models government default by random draw from distribution of fiscal limit. If 
the current level of debt surpasses the draw, government defaults on a fraction of its 
outstanding debt. If not, government fully honours all its obligations. By modelling 
default by a random draw from the distribution of fiscal limit, Bi (2010) abstracts from 
strategic concerns of default related to models of political economy.  
In Bi (2010), a representative household chooses consumption and leisure and 
government bond purchases to maximize expected present value of utility. Proportional 
                                                        
9 The Laffer curve is not the only rationale for fiscal limits. Sargent and Wallace (1981) analyse a type of 
fiscal limit in a model in which seigniorage revenues are explicitly accounted for. In their model, private 
sector’s demand for government bonds imposes an upper bound on the debt-GDP ratio.  
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tax on labour distorts household’s choice and induces a Laffer curve in the economy. The 
Laffer curve, given level of government purchases and lump-sum transfers, results in a 
ceiling for surplus in any period and gives rise to a fiscal limit. In Bi (2010), fiscal limit is 
also affected by political willingness to raise taxes near revenue maximising rates. This 
is modelled by the parameter   in the following expression for fiscal limit 
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where     
     is a discount factor depending on household’s subjective discount factor 
and marginal utility of consumption when tax rate is set at the peak of the Laffer curve,   
is political risk factor,   
    is maximal revenue at time i and    and    are government 
transfers and purchases respectively. 
The distribution of the fiscal limit is country-specific and depends on underlying 
parameters of the model. However, Bi (2010) emphasises that the fiscal limit is 
independent of equilibrium conditions of the model. Bi (2010) estimates distribution of 
the fiscal limit by using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation. 
Bi (2010) calibrates the model to economies of Canada, New Zealand, Belgium, Japan 
and Sweden and observes that the model predicts distributions of fiscal limits consistent 
with the sovereign credit ratings on these countries. The model also produces a 
nonlinear “S-shaped” relationship between sovereign risk premia and the level of 
government debt which is consistent with empirical evidence. 
The model by Bi (2010) is one attempt to estimate fiscal limits and endogenise the 
relationship between interest rates on government debt and the debt level. Even though 
the model is fairly simple it produces encouraging qualitative results that match 
empirical observations. The model has many assumptions that are not very realistic 
such as the simplistic logarithmic utility function and linear production function, 
assumption that government is an automaton and the deterministic tax rule followed by 
government. In spite of all this, our opinion is that Bi (2010) and other recently 
published papers on fiscal limits represent a new and promising way to look at public 
finance sustainability.  
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8.2 FISCAL SPACE 
Ostry et al. (2010) introduce another approach to estimate the degree to which a 
country has room for fiscal manoeuvring, that is the fiscal space, by looking at the 
historical record of the country’s fiscal policy. The intent of the approach is similar to 
that of fiscal limits though methodology differs significantly. Ostry et al. (2010) define 
fiscal space as the difference between the current level of public debt and the debt limit 
implied by the country’s historical record of fiscal adjustment.  Their approach to 
estimating an upper limit for public debt is based on the fiscal reaction function 
pioneered by Bohn (1998) which determines country’s primary balance as a function of 
the debt level.  
First component of the analysis of Ostry et al. (2010) involves determination of the fiscal 
reaction function. Ostry et al. observe that governments usually behave responsibly 
increasing primary surplus in response to rising debt service in order to stabilize the 
debt ratio. However, this cannot always be true because at sufficiently high levels of debt 
this would require primary balance to exceed GDP. They plot primary balance ratio 
against public debt ratio for a sample 23 advanced economies over the period 1970-
2007 and observe that there seems to be a S-shape or loosely sigmoid-shape 
relationship between the two. In other words, while fiscal effort is increasing in debt 
level, the effort eventually diminishes as tax increases and spending cuts become less 
and less feasible politically. This relationship is depicted by the solid line in Figure 5. 
The second component of the analysis by Ostry et al. is the determination of the interest 
rate schedule which gives the ratio of primary balance to GDP that leads to unchanged 
debt ratio as a function of debt ratio. This is equivalent with the “debt-stabilising 
primary balance” defined in chapter 5: 
   
( (  )   )  
   
 ( (  )   )    
The dashed line in Figure 5 depicts the interest rate schedule. Given that interest rate   
doesn’t depend on the debt level, which is the case for low levels of debt, the interest 
rate schedule is a linear function of the debt level. However, as the debt level rises and 
country’s solvency comes under question, creditors start to demand increased yields 
because of the default risk. This means the interest rate schedule turns steeply upward 
at some point ( ̂ in Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Determination of the debt limit. Source: Ostry et al. (2010). 
Figure 5 presents a heuristic treatment of the determination of the debt limit according 
to Ostry et al. (2010). The two curves, primary balance reaction function (solid line) and 
interest rate schedule (dashed line), intersect at two points. The intersection at a lower 
level of debt ratio corresponds to the conditionally stable long-run public debt ratio (  ). 
The intersection at a higher level of debt ratio corresponds to the debt limit ( ̃ and  ̅). 
Given that debt ratio is below the debt limit, absent shocks, the country’s debt ratio will 
eventually converge to the long-run stable ratio because below    primary balance 
response is such that debt ratio increases and above    it is such that debt ratio 
decreases. Ostry et al. define two debt limits:  ̃ and  ̅. The former is based on the 
interest rate schedule which assumes that interest rate doesn’t increase with the debt 
ratio. The latter is based on assumption that due to the possibility of stochastic shocks to 
primary balance markets will require a risk premium on top of the risk-free rate after 
some point  ̂ which causes the interest rate schedule to turn upwards and to intersect 
the primary balance reaction function earlier than in a riskless world. Beyond the debt 
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limit the country’s debt ratio will increase without bounds in absence of historically 
extraordinary fiscal effort.  
Ostry et al. (2010) estimate fiscal reaction function relating primary balances to lagged 
debt and various economic, structural and institutional variables, as well as country-
specific fixed effects using a sample of 23 advanced economies over the period 1970-
2007. The function is cubic in lagged debt allowing for two apparent inflection points in 
the fiscal reaction function. Ostry et al. assume that coefficients of the debt ratio in this 
function are the same for all countries. Varying fiscal reactions for different countries 
are allowed for by the country-specific fixed effects other independent explanatory 
variables. 
Ostry et al. (2010) determine interest rate schedule using two techniques. Firstly, they 
use a linear form of the interest rate schedule with either historical or projected interest 
rate-growth rate differential. Secondly, they calculate the interest rate schedule 
endogenously by using country-specific histories of shocks to primary balances. This 
second technique accounts for the fact that interest rate rises as country gets nearer its 
debt limit.  
Using the estimated fiscal reaction functions and interest rate schedules, Ostry et al. 
(2010) calculate values of long-run debt ratio (  ), debt limit ( ̅)  and fiscal space 
(difference between debt ratio projected for 2015 and the debt limit) for different 
advanced economies. Furthermore, in order to take into account the uncertainty, they 
report the estimates of fiscal space in terms of probability that a country has a given 
amount (0, 50 or 100 % of GDP) of remaining fiscal space. For example, they estimate 
the probability that a country has any fiscal space left is 6.3 %, 34.4 %, 71.8 % and 96.2 
% for Greece, Portugal, United States and Finland. Their estimates of debt limits, fiscal 
spaces and the associated probabilities vary greatly between the countries in the 
sample.  
The approach to estimate debt limits and resulting fiscal space by Ostry et al. (2010) 
appears promising. The debt limit is calculated based on a country’s past record of fiscal 
policies. The framework with fiscal reaction function and interest rate schedule is both 
simple and quite easy to practically implement. The crucial interaction between the level 
of debt and interest rates is explicitly modelled. Furthermore, the debt limit and fiscal 
space are pretty intuitive concepts and thus can be relatively easily communicated. 
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Weakness of the approach is that it needs quite a lot of data for determination of the 
fiscal reaction function. Such data is not usually available for countries for sufficiently 
broad range of debt ratio levels. For this reason Ostry et al. had to assume common 
regression coefficients and use in part common data for estimation of the reaction 
functions. In addition, the approach doesn’t look at the public sector balance sheet as a 
whole: it doesn’t explicitly account for government assets, expected spending pressures 
e.g. due to aging and contingent liabilities. It would be preferable to use net worth or net 
debt to GDP ratios instead of gross debt to GDP ratio.   
9. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS 
This section describes three papers that analyse public finance sustainability by using 
general equilibrium models: GE-OLG model by Moraga and Vidal (2004) application of 
AGE-OLG model by van Ewijk et al. (2006) and application of CGE-OLG model by 
Andersen and Pedersen (2006). Many papers that use general equilibrium models to 
study sustainability are very theoretical. These three papers were chosen for further 
study because in them, these models are applied for practical policy analysis. 
9.1 GE-OLG MODEL BY MORAGA AND VIDAL 
Moraga and Vidal (2004) investigate fiscal sustainability in a general equilibrium 
overlapping generations model with endogenous growth resulting from human capital 
formation through educational spending. Interest rate and growth rate of the economy 
which have a crucial effect on long-run sustainability are determined endogenously in 
the model. In the model fiscal sustainability means that economic equilibrium exists in 
every period.  
The model’s economy has three sectors: households, firms and the public sector. 
Household sector consists of individuals that live through three periods: childhood, 
adulthood and old-age. These individuals maximize utility which is derived from private 
and public consumption in adulthood and old-age and their children’s expected wage 
level. Consumption, saving and educational spending are financed by labour income 
which depends on individual’s human capital. An individual’s human capital is 
determined in their childhood by her parents’ human capital and educational spending. 
This process of human capital formation is the engine of growth in the economy. 
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Production occurs in firms which use physical and human capital as inputs. Each period, 
firms choose demand for labour to maximize profits in a competitive setting. The public 
sector consists of the government which levies taxes, pays pension benefits to retirees, 
finances public consumption and reimburses existing stock of debt along with interest 
payments.  
Moraga and Vidal (2004) derive a system of two differential equations which determine 
the dynamics of the economy. They describe the evolution of stock physical capital and 
government debt relative to stock of human capital. No general analytical solution exits 
for the system. Moraga and Vidal calibrate the model roughly to European Union data. 
By means of simulations they study the effect of a demographic shock which is projected 
to occur in the EU during the next 50 years. They show that the demographic change 
leads to unsustainable situation unless fiscal policies are changed in response. Proper 
fiscal rules guarantee convergence to a new equilibrium and thus sustainability. 
The strengths of the model by Moraga and Vidal (2004) concerning sustainability 
assessments lie on theoretical analysis of an economy. It allows for study of the impact 
of various shocks and fiscal rules to sustainability. However, it is not so well suited to 
practical sustainability assessments concerning actual countries. The overlapping 
generations framework only allows for a crude description of the dynamics because 
length of the period is 1/3 of a lifetime, i.e. very long (Moraga and Vidal use 30 years). 
Furthermore, it is hard to calibrate. To assess sustainability more realistically, 
adjustments to the model such as shorter time period, more detailed generational 
structure and richer description of the tax and pension policies are needed.  
9.2 APPLICATION OF AGE-OLG MODEL BY VAN EWIJK ET AL. 
Van Ewijk et al. (2006) use a large scale applied general equilibrium model with 
overlapping generations of households to study ageing and its effect on sustainability of 
public finances in Netherlands. The model they use is called GAMMA and it is 
constructed for the purpose of analysing long-term public policy issues.  
The model consists of the following agents: households, government, firms, pension 
funds and the foreign sector. Households are divided up into 100 age cohorts. 
Households decide on labour supply and private saving, firms decide on demand for 
labour and capital and pension funds decide on pension contributions and benefit levels. 
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Agents are rational and forward-looking and optimise in a consistent microeconomic 
framework. The model includes a comprehensive set of generational accounts for all 
current and future generations. The Dutch economy is modelled as a small open 
economy. Interest rate determined in world capital markets and it is not affected by 
domestic policies. Domestic and foreign goods are assumed to be perfect substitutes. 
Perfect labour and capital markets are assumed. Furthermore, the model is 
deterministic.  
Van Ewijk et al. (2006) construct a baseline projection which forecasts the evolution of 
public finances and the economy under unchanged policies from year 2006 onwards. 
Detailed demographic projections up to year 2100 are employed. In the baseline 
scenario, they assume that age-specific expenditures increase at the rate of productivity 
of private sector productivity and aggregate non-age-related expenditures increase at 
the rate of GDP growth. They assume annual rate of labour-augmenting technological 
change of 1.7 %, average real market rate of return of 3 % and inflation of 2 %. 
Government revenues are determined endogenously from household and firm 
behaviour except for natural resource revenues which evolve in line with separate 
projections. Van Ewijk et al. also conduct sensitivity tests around this baseline projection 
by varying parameter values and assumptions. 
Van Ewijk et al. (2006) find that Dutch public finances are unsustainable in the long run. 
This is primarily due to population ageing which leads to significant increases in pension 
and health care expenditures and projected depletion of natural gas reserves and the 
associated revenue flow. They estimate that total debt, the sum of net debt (official debt 
minus financial assets of the government) and implicit debt that is due to projected 
deficits, is 2 times GDP in 2006. This indicator is equivalent with financing gap derived 
earlier in chapter 5. The annuity value of this total debt amounts to 2.6 % GDP which is 
the sustainability gap equivalent with infinite horizon sustainability gap. They conduct 
sensitivity tests around the baseline scenario and estimate a confidence interval of 
(0.9%, 5.1%) for the sustainability gap.  
The study by van Ewijk et al. (2006) is a successful application of generational 
equilibrium framework to assessment of public finance sustainability. Model is detailed 
and structurally rich and therefore should be able to produce accurate projections 
concerning the Dutch economy. Interactions between the various forces in the economy 
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are better accounted for than if separate models were used for projecting the inputs to 
sustainability calculations. Weakness of this approach is that a lot of detailed data about 
the economy under analysis is required. Secondly, a lot of effort needs to be put in to 
build such a large scale model. Finally, despite the structural richness of the model, there 
is no practical guarantee about its predictive accuracy.  
9.3 APPLICATION OF CGE-OLG MODEL BY ANDERSEN AND PEDERSEN 
Andersen and Pedersen (2006) use a large scale dynamic computable general 
equilibrium overlapping generations model to study the long-term sustainability of 
fiscal policies in Denmark. The model they use is called DREAM, the Danish Rational 
Economic Agents Model, developed for the specific purpose of evaluating medium- to 
long-term effects of fiscal policy in Denmark.10  
DREAM model represents a small open economy with a fixed exchange rate regime, 
perfect mobility of capital and imperfect substitutability of Danish and foreign products 
in consumption and production. The model uses a detailed household structure based 
on projections of Danish population. The adult population has 85 generations and a 
representative household is generated for each of the generations. Each household 
optimizes its labour supply, consumption and savings decisions given perfect foresight. 
The labour market modelled as having unionized behaviour. There are two private 
production sectors: a construction sector and a sector for other goods and services. The 
model assumes an exogenous productivity growth rate of 2 % per annum and an 
exogenous foreign inflation rate of 2 % per annum.  
Public sector produces goods for public consumption and levies taxes and pays transfers 
and subsidies to firms and households.  Taxes, transfers and subsidies are modelled with 
great detail in order to match the actual rules and regulations in Denmark as closely as 
possible. There are numerous different types of taxes and transfers in the model.  The 
expenditures for individual public consumption (education, health and social 
expenditures) are forecasted to increase with rate of inflation and the exogenous 
productivity growth.  
Andersen and Pedersen (2006) use two indicators to study the long-term sustainability 
of public finances in Denmark. Pay-as-you go indicator calculates the path of yearly 
                                                        
10 Detailed information can be found at www.dreammodel.dk. 
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changes in the base tax required to balance the budget each year. Therefore, this 
indicator imposes a constant public debt level on the economy. The second indicator 
calculates the difference between the constant level of base tax rate required for inter-
temporal budget constraint to hold (the sustainable tax rate) and the current base tax 
rate. Thus, the level of debt is allowed to fluctuate while the tax rate remains constant. 
This second indicator is reminiscent of the infinite horizon tax gap indicator (ITGAP) 
derived earlier in this paper. However, it is notable that due to flexibility of the DREAM 
model, these indicators can be calculated for the case of any tax or expenditure variables 
in the model.  
Andersen and Pedersen (2006) calculate the sustainability indicators with respect to an 
“unchanged policy” scenario which represents the state of existing policies and their 
expected continuation in Denmark in year 2003. Projections from the model show that 
in the “unchanged policy” scenario expenditures increase faster than revenues and the 
former surpasses the latter around 2020 with the gap growing larger from then on. This 
is mostly due to projected permanent change in the demographic dependency ratio.  The 
PAYG sustainability indicator in which consequences of the demographic changes are 
finances in a period-by-period basis shows a similar pattern: needed increases from the 
initial base tax rate accumulate in a constant manner increase being in the year 2040 
around 4.5 %. The sustainable tax indicator finances the consequences of the 
demographic changes in using a pre-funding strategy: tax rate is immediately raised to a 
level which is needed to satisfy the inter-temporal budget constraint of the government. 
The increase in the base tax rate required for this hold was 7.9 %. Thus, both indicators 
point to the existence of a sizable sustainability problem in Denmark. Alternative 
changes that would re-establish sustainability were a permanent reduction in public 
expenditures of 3.2% of GDP and permanent increase in employment by 10 %. Andersen 
and Pedersen also perform detailed sensitivity analyses to estimate the sensitivity of the 
sustainability assessments to various changes in policy assumptions. Furthermore, using 
the model, they assess the effects of retirement and labour market reforms.  
Andersen and Pedersen (2006) represents an application of detailed large scale 
structural model to study the sustainability of public finances. The benefits of this kind 
of approach are apparent: realistic modelling of the interactions in the economy should 
enable better and more detailed analysis of needed policy reforms. There are some 
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caveats too, however. Firstly, a lot of data needs to be amassed to calibrate the model 
parameters. Secondly, despite the structural accuracy of the model there is not much 
assurance about the predictive accuracy of the model at least in the case of long-run 
predictions. Thirdly, the structural description of the economy with utility maximising 
representative agents, perfect mobility of capital and other modelling assumptions is 
open to question. Fourthly, the model as we understood it was not stochastic, i.e. didn’t 
account for effects of uncertainty in the various variables which might compromise 
some of the results. Finally, a large effort is required to build such a detailed model.  
10. GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING AND SUSTAINABILITY 
Generational accounting (see e.g. Auerbach et al. 1991) measures sustainability from a 
little bit different perspective than traditional evaluations based on yearly budget 
surpluses. In the context of generational accounts, public finance sustainability means 
that the fiscal burden, i.e. the payment of taxes net of received benefits, is distributed 
evenly among different generations.  If a lot of fiscal burden is shifted to future 
generations fiscal policy is deemed unsustainable. This definition of sustainability is 
closely related to the usual definitions of public finance sustainability which associate 
sustainability to non-excessive debt accumulation. This is because the way in which 
fiscal burden is shifted to future generations is by taking debt. A large national debt or 
big deficits therefore signals that future generations are made to pay for the current and 
past government consumption in addition to future government consumption.  
The basis of sustainability treatment using generational accounts is the inter-temporal 
budget constraint: 
   ∑ (   )
 (   )   
 
     
  
where    is the present stock of net debt,     is the primary balance at time  , and   is 
the interest rate at time  . 
Generational accounts approach differs from the standard surplus-based treatment of 
national accounts in that it disaggregates the surplus to contributions made by different 
generations: 
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where        denotes the net payments (payments made minus benefits received) to 
government at time s by generation born at time s-i, M is the maximum length of life and 
   is government consumption at time s that is collective in the sense that it cannot be 
allocated to different generations.  
Combining the two equations above gives: 
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Separating generations born prior to time t from those born thereafter: 
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where     is the value at time t of the net payments to government to be made by a 
generation born at time k. 
In the above equation, first term is the net payments to government to be made by 
generations living at time t, i.e. currently. The second term is the net payments to 
government to be made by future generations. The last term is the present value of all 
future collective government consumption. 
The generational account       means the net payments per capita to be made by 
members of generation k from time t onwards valued at time t. In other words, it is the 
present value of the net tax burden facing average member of generation k. The 
relationship between       and the total payment of the generation     is: 
          (   )         
where      is the number of people of generation k alive at time t.  
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Sustainability analysis using generational accounts is based on comparison between the 
net tax burden facing currently living generations and future generations. The total net 
payments to be made by future generations are: 
∑      
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The first term on the right side, net debt, can be calculated using government balance 
sheets. The second term, present value of collective government consumption, can 
estimated using projections of government purchases of goods and services. The last 
term on the right side, net tax burden of current generations, can be determined using 
projections of annual aggregate taxes and transfers, population forecasts, micro-data 
surveys of tax payments and transfer receipts by age and cohort-specific mortality rates.  
Thus, the total present value tax burden facing future generations, the term on the left 
side, can be determined as a residual of the IBC.  
To make net payments between generations comparable, per capita net payments, that 
is, generational accounts of different generations are calculated. The generational 
accounts of current generations can be estimated from the abovementioned data 
sources. In order to estimate the per capita net payments of future generations 
assumptions about the distribution of the payments have to be made. The usual 
assumption is that the net tax burden measured at the time generation is born grows at 
the rate of GDP growth: 
                 (   )(   )
    
               (
   
   
)
   
  
Thus, provided that r>g, present value of payments is lower for generations farther in 
the future. Substituting this yields an estimate for the net tax burden facing the 
generation t+1: 
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The sustainability of public finances can then be assessed by comparing the projected 
net payments to be made the by the newborn generation       to the calculated net 
payments to be made by future-born generation        . This can be done for example 
by calculating the indicator (generational balance): 
   
       
     
  
If the indicator value is greater than one, there exists an inter-generational sustainability 
problem and too much tax burden is shifted to future generations. If the value is less 
than one, policies are sustainable but too much tax burden is borne by the living 
generations and inter-generational equity would be better served by cutting taxes and 
issuing more debt. If the value is less than one, policies are sustainable and there is no 
inter-generational equity problem according to generational accounting. 
The table below shows an example of generational accounts (Gokhale 2008). It can be 
seen from the table that per capita net payments faced by generation born in 2005 
(333 200$) is considerably larger than per capita net payments faced by the generation 
born 2004 (104 300$). Thus, according to generational accounts approach US faces a 
sizable sustainability problem. 
TABLE 3. GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (THOUSANDS OF 
CONSTANT 2004 DOLLARS). 
 
In our opinion, generational accounting approach to fiscal sustainability seems to be 
interesting and fruitful way to analyse sustainability. The method of comparing present 
generations’ net tax burden to those of future generations sheds light to questions of 
intergenerational equity and fairness as well. However, some criticism towards the 
methodology of generational accounting has been made since its birth in early 1990s. 
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First, the assessments of generational accounting do not take into account the wide 
margins of uncertainty in the predictions and possible interactions between variables 
such as tax rates, interest rates, growth rates and predicted revenues and expenditures. 
Uncertainty part of the critique can be answered by conducting robust sensitivity 
analyses by varying central parameters in the calculations and estimating confidence 
intervals to the derived indicators instead of point estimates. Second, the usual way of 
allocating the total residual tax burden to future generations by assuming that 
generational payments grow at the rate of economic growth seems like quite narrow an 
approach.  This problem can be solved by using other assumptions. Furthermore, 
alternative fiscal and generational imbalance measures developed by Gokhale and 
Smetters (2003) that do not involve assumptions about hypothetical future policies can 
be used. Third, because of the forward-looking nature of generational accounts, the 
accounts of currently living generations cannot be compared directly. Finally, 
generational accounting does not explicitly distribute some government expenditures 
such as purchases of public goods and services and government insurance provision to 
different age groups – they are either measured as a part of collective government 
consumption or not measured at all. This may distort the results. 
11. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE APPROACHES 
In this study, six distinct approaches to assess sustainability have been described and 
analysed. They are: summary indicators of sustainability, econometric tests, Value-at-
Risk framework, fiscal limits and fiscal space, general equilibrium models and 
generational accounting. Strengths and weaknesses of the approaches were already 
touched upon when they were presented in earlier chapters. This chapter summarizes 
the strengths and weaknesses and discusses them. 
The table below summarises the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches. 
Discussion follows after the table.  
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TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE SIX APPROACHES. 
Approach Strengths Weaknesses Key references 
Summary 
indicators 
- simple to use 
- good first approximation 
- can be used with 
different modelling 
frameworks 
- easy to communicate 
- results between studies 
easy to compare 
- require inputs from other 
models 
- do not explicitly account 
for uncertainty 
- do not explicitly account 
for interactions between 
variables 
Buiter et al. 
(1985), 
Blanchard et al. 
(1990)  
Econometric 
tests 
- derived directly from 
theory 
- useful in study of past 
policies 
- mostly retrospective; 
hard to conduct 
prospective analysis 
- no quantitative measure 
of sustainability (answer 
either accept or reject) 
Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986), 
Bohn (1998; 
2005) 
Value-at-Risk 
approach 
- explicitly accounts for 
interactions and 
uncertainty 
- public sector balance 
sheet is analysed as a 
whole 
- can be used with 
different modelling 
frameworks 
- a lot of data needed 
(public sector balance 
sheet etc.) 
- large effort to build the 
model needed 
- long-run analysis hard 
 
 
Barnhill and 
Kopits (2003)  
Fiscal limits 
and fiscal 
space 
- different perspective 
- explicitly accounts for 
interactions and 
uncertainty 
- easy to communicate 
- very model-dependent 
(fiscal limits in Bi 2010) 
- a broad sample of data 
needed (fiscal space in 
Ostry et al. 2010) 
Bi (2010), 
Cochrane 
(2010), Leeper 
and Walker 
(2011a), Ostry 
et al. (2010)  
General 
equilibrium 
models 
- explicitly accounts for 
interactions 
- structurally detailed and 
accurate description of 
the economy 
- country-specific features 
can be modelled 
 
- very large effort to build 
a model 
- a lot of parameter values 
need to be calibrated 
- predictive accuracy of the 
model not guaranteed 
 
van Ewijk et al. 
(2006), 
Andersen and 
Pedersen 
(2006)  
Generational 
accounting 
- different perspective 
- inter-generational equity 
also considered 
 
- do not explicitly account 
for interactions or 
uncertainty 
- hard to allocate benefits 
of expenditures 
accurately to age groups 
Auerbach et al. 
(1991), 
Gokhale and 
Smetters 
(2003) 
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Summary indicators are probably the most common method to analyse sustainability in 
practice. They have been applied for example in European Commission (2009),  
Congressional Budget Office (2010), Parliamentary Budget Officer (2010), Krejdl (2006), 
Ministry of Finance (2010) and International Monetary Fund (2003). A key strength in 
these indicators is that they are easy to calculate and they require relatively few inputs. 
Calculation of the primary gap requires only data of current debt ratio, long-run average 
interest rate and growth rate. For tax and financing gaps projections of future primary 
balances are also required. These indicators can serve as first approximations in 
sustainability assessments. Furthermore, they can be communicated relatively easily to 
policy makers.  
Once summary indicators are employed to produce more accurate assessments of 
sustainability, simple steady state assumptions need to be relaxed. Projections of 
primary balances, interest rates and growth rates for each year in the future are needed. 
To make these predictions, some predictive tools have to be used. Thus, the assessment 
of sustainability by these indicators comes to encompass the whole of the predictive 
framework. This is a strength because these indicators can be used with different 
modelling frameworks. On the other hand, this is a weakness because the approach is 
not self-sufficient in that it requires inputs from other models. Another notable 
weakness of summary indicators is that they do not explicitly account for uncertainty in 
the input variables or for interactions between them. 
Econometric tests of sustainability are primarily useful for testing whether various 
sustainability criteria hold in historical data. They are theoretically well grounded in 
that they are based on explicit derivations from various economic and econometric 
assumptions. It is not easy to apply these tests to study the sustainability of current and 
future policies because estimation of inputs (projections of future debt levels and 
primary balances) would be needed to be done in a credibly separate process from 
testing; otherwise, the researcher can build any interrelations to data to satisfy any 
sustainability condition. Furthermore, these econometric tests either reject or accept 
sustainability of policies with some confidence level and thus do not provide a 
quantitative measure of the degree of sustainability. The tests do not directly give goals 
for policy adjustments in the case of rejection of sustainability. 
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Value-at-Risk approach by Barnhill and Kopits (2003) attempts to explicitly estimate the 
distribution of public sector net value (net worth + present value of all future cash 
flows). It takes into account the evolution of the whole public sector balance sheet and 
contingent government liabilities. This is good because changes in values of government 
assets and liabilities can affect solvency and sustainability considerations significantly. 
The approach explicitly models uncertainty in future asset values and cash flows. Also, 
interactions between variables like interest rates and output can be modelled by using 
historical correlations. Another good side of the approach is that it can be used with 
many modelling frameworks. A researcher is not limited to the specification employed 
by Barnhill and Kopits (2003) to study the economy of Ecuador but can freely choose a 
set of risk variables and the stochastic processes that describe their evolution.  
A weakness of the Value-at-Risk approach is that long-run analysis of sustainability is 
not easy because the evolution of the public sector balance sheet has to be projected into 
the far future. That is, evolution of asset and liability values 50 years into the future has 
to be described stochastically. In addition, the approach requires a lot of data about the 
public sector: current balance sheets are a minimum requirement.  Finally, one 
weakness of this approach is that quite large modelling effort is needed to construct a 
satisfactory framework for stochastic simulations. 
Estimating a debt ceiling is the crux of the analysis of sustainability with fiscal limits and 
fiscal space. Bi (2010) estimates a debt ceiling by using structural models in which the 
Laffer curve gives rise to maximum primary budget surplus in each period. Ostry et al. 
(2010) estimates debt ceilings using the fiscal reaction function which gives the 
historical response of primary balance to changes in debt level. These approaches are 
valuable because they look sustainability from a bit different angle: instead of estimating 
the current public sector net value they attempt to estimate an upper limit for debt. Both 
Bi (2010) and Ostry et al. (2010) model the feedback interaction between the debt level 
and the interest rate. In addition, both approaches explicitly allow for uncertainty in the 
estimates. The weakness of the approach by Bi is that it relies on a specific model which 
is quite theoretical and simplistic. Thus, the estimated debt ceilings cannot be regarded 
as very reliable.  The weakness of the approach by Ostry et al. is that it requires data of 
the response of primary surplus to wide range debt levels which is not available for 
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most countries. Thus, data from other countries fiscal responses are needed to 
supplement the estimation of fiscal reaction functions.  
Using general equilibrium models to analyse public finance sustainability is perhaps 
theoretically the most accurate way to prepare sustainability estimates, but not 
necessarily in practice. GE models are good because they model the economy and its 
structure in detail. This means country-specific features like tax and pension systems 
can be described realistically as a part of the model. Also, interactions between the 
economic variables are modelled in a realistic and comprehensive manner. Weakness of 
this approach is that a very large effort is needed to build such a detailed model of the 
economy that is typical for applied general equilibrium models. Secondly, a lot of 
parameter values have to be estimated which increases the possibility of error. Thirdly, 
a weakness of the GE models is that they are in a sense “black box” –models for the 
average policy maker because of their complexity. This makes it hard to communicate 
and built trust in the results. Finally, despite structurally accurate description of the 
economy, the predictive accuracy of these models cannot be taken for granted. 
Generational accounting analyses sustainability from yet another perspective. It 
compares the net tax burden of current generations to that of future generations. If the 
tax burden of future generations is much heavier than that of current generations, 
policies are considered unsustainable. This approach is good also because it gives 
information about inter-generational equity in addition to policy sustainability. 
Weakness of generational accounting is that uncertainty and interactions between 
model variables are not explicitly accounted for. In addition, the estimation of benefits 
that accrue to different age groups from public policies is not easy and may cause errors 
in results. 
12. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the central findings of the thesis. In addition, some general 
points about conducting sustainability assessments are made which are relevant 
regardless of the specific approach chosen. 
In this study, several alternative theoretical criteria for public finance sustainability 
have been examined. Most important of these are government’s inter-temporal budget 
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constraint, Bohn’s model-based sustainability criterion and the boundedness of debt-to-
GDP ratio. The inter-temporal budget constraint is clearly the most commonly used of 
these criteria. There exists some well-founded criticism against the use of the IBC as de-
facto condition for public finance sustainability. It seems to us that Bohn’s model-based 
sustainability criterion, which is a generalization of the traditional IBC, is better as a 
general theoretical condition for sustainability than the IBC. 
Six approaches to assess sustainability of public finances have been analysed in this 
thesis. These approaches are: summary indicators of sustainability, econometric tests, 
Value-at-Risk framework, fiscal limits and fiscal space, general equilibrium models and 
generational accounting. These approaches and their application in sustainability 
assessments have been described. Furthermore, the strengths and weaknesses of these 
approaches from the viewpoint of practical policy analysis have been analysed.   
It seems that summary indicators of sustainability based on steady state analysis can be 
used as first approximations in sustainability assessments. Also, they can be used to 
effectively communicate results to policy makers. In our opinion, a more detailed and 
broad modelling framework is preferable for detailed assessments of sustainability. 
Such approaches are for example general equilibrium models and the VaR approach. 
Strength of general equilibrium models lies in that they can be tailored for country-
specific tax systems, pension schemes and other policies and thus can be expected 
provide better estimates of long-run sustainability than less detailed models. The VaR 
approach, on the other hand, can be useful in situations where there are significant 
uncertainties and variations in government cash flows and asset and liability values. 
Such is the case, for example, in many emerging market economies. Estimation of debt 
ceilings (fiscal limits and fiscal space) and generational accounting can give a different 
viewpoint on sustainability: debt ceilings by considering the amount of fiscal 
manoeuvring space government has and generational accounting by considering inter-
generational equity.  
In general, no single approach can be singled out as a preferable to others in every 
situation. Each of the approaches has its uses. The approaches are complementary 
rather than rivalrous, each looking sustainability from somewhat different angle. From 
purely theoretical perspective, general equilibrium models and the Value-at-Risk 
approach appear most attractive. However, it is worth to bear in mind that theoretical 
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complexity and finesse are no guarantees for ability to forecast accurately and that 
sustainability estimates crucially depend on accurate projections.  
The approaches analysed in this thesis do not explicitly consider seigniorage or money 
printing by central bank as a means to combat rising level of debt. However, it is not 
ruled out: the approaches just assume that seigniorage revenue is zero. This means that 
some or possibly the entire sustainability gap observed can be covered by large-scale 
money printing by central bank. This option is of course available only for countries 
which have an independent central bank. There have been some work to this direction 
in the area of  research on monetary and fiscal policy interactions: for instance, Davig et 
al. (2011) and Leeper and Walker (2011b).  However, it would be interesting to see 
more models and sustainability assessments which explicitly take this option and its 
costs (high inflation) into consideration. 
When making sustainability assessments, it is very important to take into account the 
various sources of uncertainties in the calculations. Any projections of future cash flows 
or other variables such as those pertaining to population forecasts should be 
accompanied with a measure of the degree of uncertainty in the projections: for 
example, the variance of the future forecasts around the estimated mean. When the 
uncertainties from different sources are identified and quantified, it makes the 
assessment of uncertainty in the end results, such as sustainability gaps, much easier. 
Any sustainability assessment should not only produce a point estimate of the needed 
adjustment to re-establish sustainability but also give a measure of the variance around 
the point estimate: confidence interval, standard deviation or ideally a probability 
distribution. Uncertainty assessments can be done for example by conducting sensitivity 
analyses. However, if possible, they should not be ad-hoc in nature but be based on the 
probability distributions of inputs and the structure of the model used to produce the 
sustainability estimates. 
Results of sustainability assessments can be sensitive to the assumptions about the 
initial state of the economy. Thus, if economy is assumed to be in recession, a great part 
of the sustainability problem can be solved just by waiting the economy to get out of the 
slump. If, on the other hand, the assumption is that the economy resides in a midway of 
the business cycle or is booming, none of the sustainability problem can be solved by 
waiting the things to normalise.  Corrections for the cyclical factor (e.g. using cyclically 
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adjusted inputs) have to assume some initial cyclical state for the economy. This 
uncertainty about the initial cycle point, i.e. the near-term economic developments, 
feeds right into uncertainty of the sustainability estimates. This factor of uncertainty can 
be accounted for like any other: by using sensitivity tests or other methods derive a 
distribution of values of the sustainability indicator. Another option is try to separate 
the effects of long-term developments from the effect of the initial position in a manner 
similar to European Commission (2009) which decomposes the sustainability gap to two 
parts: a part caused by initial budgetary position and a part caused by long-term 
demographic developments. 
One important aspect which may affect public finance sustainability in a country is the 
net foreign asset position of the country. If the country runs persistent current account 
deficits thus accumulating foreign liabilities, this may signal an external imbalance 
which may lead to large-scale private debt deleveraging, banking crises and to 
eventually to a soverign debt crisis. As noted by Chalk and Hemming (2000), there is a 
concept of current account sustainability or external sustainability that is closely 
parallel to the concept of public finance sustainability that can be utilised to examine the 
sustainability of the external debt position of an economy. Analysis of current account 
sustainability and private sector debt sustainability is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, it would be very interesting to see research explicitly linking current account 
sustainability and public finance sustainability. 
Finally, it is worth noting that regardless of the method used to analyse sustainability, it 
is paramount to take a comprehensive view of the public sector finances. That is, 
construct an estimate of the balance sheet, contingent liabilities and evolution of asset 
prices and volumes in addition to the usual projections of future government revenues 
and expenditures. Results of the sustainability assessment can be seriously 
compromised if only budget balances and gross debt is studied. In general, this calls for a 
more detailed, transparent and explicit treatment of government assets and liabilities. 
This study was not a fully comprehensive literature review on sustainability 
assessments. The bulk of literature that relates to public finance sustainability is large 
and growing. It seems to us that during the last few years a lot of new papers have been 
published in response to long-run sustainability problems in developed countries due to 
population ageing and the on-going sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Therefore, we 
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expect that the analysis of public finance and public debt sustainability continues to 
develop significantly in the coming years. 
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APPENDIX 1: TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 
Some basic definitions related to stochastic processes and time series analysis. 
STATIONARY STOCHASTIC PROCESS 
A stochastic process *  +   
  is stationary if its joint distribution function for times 
              (              ) doesn’t change when time is shifted, i.e. : 
 (              )   (                    ) 
for all n,   and             . 
Covariance stationarity is a commonly used form of stationarity in which only mean and 
autocovariances are required to be time invariant: 
 ,  -    
   (       )      
DIFFERENCE-STATIONARY STOCHASTIC PROCESS 
A stochastic process *  +   
  is said to be difference-stationary if it is not stationary but 
its first difference         is stationary.  
UNIT ROOT 
A stochastic process that has a unit root is not stationary. Unit root means that 1 is a root 
of the process’s characteristic equation. 
COINTEGRATION 
A time series is said to be integrated of order d, denoted I(d), if it has a stationary, 
invertible, non-deterministic ARMA representation after differencing d times. 
Differencing means forming a new series from the original by taking the first difference  
       . When differencing d times, this is operation is repeated recursively d times. 
Take two time series    and    which are both I(d). Usually any linear combination of    
and    will be I(d). However, if there exists a coefficient   such that the linear 
combination           is I(d-b), then the series    and    are said to be cointegrated 
of order (d,b) with   as a cointegration coefficient. 
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If two time series are co-integrated they share a common stochastic drift and thus 
cannot evolve into opposite directions for very long. 
